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i JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
2 The court has jurisdiction conveyed by a letter from the Supreme Court of Utah, dated 
3 February 13, 1998, assigning the appeal of this case to the Court of Appeals (R. at 622). 
4 STATEMENTS OF THE ISSUES 
5 The issues addressed in this reply brief focus on the issues raised in the Appellee Brief of 
6 Third-Party Defendant, 9/1/98. The four substantive issues are: 
7 1. Was the trial court correct in finding that Defendant breached the lease agreement 
8 without justifiable cause? 
9 2. Did the trial court have proper grounds for dismissal of Third-Party Complaint? 
10 3. Did the trial court properly act in dismissing Defendant's request for sanctions? 
11 4. Was the trial court correct in finding that Defendant was required to provide a 
12 second Utah Fit Premises Act notice in an action for breach of contract and 
13 constructive eviction? 
14 Each of these issues will be addressed using page and paragraph references to the 
15 Appellee Brief filed by Third-Party Defendant for ease of correlation. 
16 
17 
18 DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUROTY 
19 PROVISIONS 
20 Third-Party Defendant's Appellee brief contains a statement in this section that "there are 
1 Statutory issues in dealing with the application of the Utah Fit Premises Act." This statement 
2 would suggest an argument would be presented in the body of the brief. No argument was 
3 found. However, the application of the UFPA notice requirements to cases involving landlord 
4 breach of contract, constructive eviction, and breach of the implied warranty of habitability is 
5 subject to the degree to which the UFPA being sought as a right of action by either party. 
6 Additionally, the intent of the UFPA (which evolved from the Owner-Renter Relations 
7 Amendment in 1990) is to provide an avenue of leverage and relief to tenants who are 
8 subjected to uninhabitable rental conditions, and who chose to remain in the premises or are 
9 without the resources needed to vacate the premises, as is required in matters of constructive 
10 eviction. This leverage is intended to allow tenants to secure required repairs and remain in the 
11 premises, using the threat of legal action against the landlord. The leverage of the tenant is 
12 equaled for the landlord by his/her not being liable for defects caused by the tenants. 
13 In the instant action, none of the parties are seeking any right of action via the UFPA. 
14 The UFPA was cited by Defendant/Appellant as one of the many joint failures of Plaintiff and 
15 Third-Party Defendant. The joint failures of Third-Party Defendant and Plaintiff to comply 
16 with the provisions of the UFPA, which requires compliance with local ordinance (Ogden 
17 City), which in-turn requires compliance with applicable building codes, were cited in the 
18 counterclaim and Third-Party claim. The result of the collective failures of Plaintiff and Third-
19 Party Defendant is an unsafe property with numerous construction code violations, which was 
20 offered for rent on the public market, and thereby misrepresented by Third-Party Defendant (a 
21 professional property manager in Ogden) as compliant with the provisions of the UFPA, local 
22 ordinances, and all applicable building and safety codes. This collection of failures was not 
23 cited as a claim for relief through the provisions of the UFPA, but rather to indicate just some 
2 
1 of the many requirements that were ignored by Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant. Since 
2 Defendant claimed no relief via the UFPA, notice requirements of the UFPA are not applicable 
3 to this action for: 
4 a. breach of contract for failure to perform and deliver, 
5 b. constructive eviction, and 
6 c. breach of the implied warranty of habitability, in addition to 
7 d. fraud for intentional misrepresentation of compliance with applicable statute, 
8 ordinance, and building codes: 
9 • when Plaintiff and Third-Party conspired to repair known defects with 
10 rental income, thereby requiring that Tenants endure unsafe and non-code 
11 compliant conditions while Plaintiff and Third-Party benefited financially 
12 from the conspiracy, and 
13 • by misrepresenting that known defects would be immediately cured and 
14 Plaintiffs personal effects would be immediately removed. 
15 • by misrepresenting that the premises were statute, ordinance, and building 
16 code compliant at the time the lease was signed by Defendant. 
17 
18 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
19 
20 The first three lines of Third-Party Defendant's fact number four are in error. The correct 
21 facts are that Defendant walked-through the premises with Third-Party Defendant prior to 
22 forming the contingent oral agreements and signing the lease agreement on June 30, 1995. 
3 
1 Defendant (Trial Transcript pages 227-228). And Third-Party Defendant/Appellee simply 
2 fabricated the second sentence as Defendant never stated that the premises were tenantable, at 
3 any time. To correct the record, that Defendant did not declare the premises to be tenantable, 
4 the entirety of page 227 of the trial transcript is included herein as follows: 
5 [Defendant - Witness, continued from previous page] place and, 
6 and visited the property. I was in a property in Salt Lake City. The owner 
7 had decided to move back into the State of Utah and wanted the property 
8 back. The term of my lease was up and I needed to find a place. We 
9 looked for some time to find property and were not terribly successful. A 
10 couple of what we thought were good agreements fell through with good 
11 houses. We discussed those with Mr. Wheeler when we came to visit the 
12 house and therefore some sense of urgency. My time was running out. I 
13 needed to get into a place. 
14 We found the house based on an ad in the paper, called Mr. Wheeler, 
15 set up an appointment, went up and looked at it. 
16 We walked through the house. First observation of the house, it's a 
17 substantial house, there's no argument about that. The pictures reflect 
18 that. And the substantialness of the house tends to make one think in 
19 terms of what a wonderful house and you gloss through it looking at wood 
20 floors, wood walls, look at all the logs, look at the big rocks in the 
21 fireplaces, look at all the beams. And your, Mr. Wheeler's statement that 
22 the, the house was found to be attractive in looking [continued on next 
23 page] 
24 
25 Third-Party Defendant's fact number five omitted the qualifying critical information that 
26 the city inspector had never visited the premises or reviewed construction plans of the 
27 premises. Additionally, the correct statement by this witness was "My first impression is 
28 probably tenantable but it needs some maintenance." (Trial Transcript page 74) And this 
29 witness had a professional vested interest in the property being declared habitable, for his 
30 office had issued a residential rental license for the property after receiving Defendant's 
31 10/18/95 letter, (Exhibit 81-D). This "interest" would only serve to bias the witness regarding 
32 the stated condition of the premises. 
33 Third-Party Defendant's fact number six omitted critical information that Mr. Froerer's 
4 
1 opinion of the habitability of the premises was contingent on required repairs being completed 
2 as follows: 
3 Q. [Fink] Back to the question Counsel asked on whether or not you thought 
4 the house was habitable. 
5 A. [Froerer] Uh-huh (affirmative). 
6 Q. With or without repair? 
7 A. No. We wanted repairs done. 
8 And this witness also had a professional vested interest in having the premises declared 
9 habitable, for his agency had listed the premises for lease after Defendant terminated the lease 
10 and vacated the premises. This "interest" would only serve to bias the witness regarding the 
11 stated condition of the premises, and even then, this witness effectively stated that the premises 
12 were not habitable during Defendant's tenancy. 
13 Third-Party Defendant's fact number nine omitted critical information regarding the fact 
14 presented; that being Defendant's response to Plaintiffs examination that the employment 
15 move "provided an opportunity to reduce costs" (Trial Transcript page 246). 
16 Third-Party Defendant's fact number 12 presumes that the Defendant brought this action 
17 according to the provisions of the UFPA. As stated earlier in this brief, Defendant simply cited 
18 the collective failures of the Third-Party Defendant and Plaintiff, one of which was failure to 
19 comply with the provisions of the UFPA, specifically, that all rentals must be building code 
20 and ordinance compliant, and safe properties. 
21 
22 ARGUMENTS 
23 What Third-Party Defendant Did Not Argue or Deny 
24 Conspicuously, throughout the entirety of his Appellee brief, Third-Party Defendant: 
5 
Did not deny his oral agreement with Defendant to remove Plaintiffs 
personal property from the premises within two weeks. (Defendant's Brief 
in Chief, page 10) 
Did not deny that Plaintiffs property was not removed during Defendant's 
tenancy. (Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 15) 
Did not deny his oral agreement with Defendant to repair defects in the 
premises as soon as possible. (Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 10) 
Did not deny that the defects identified by Defendant, most notably, the 
electrical system defects, were not repaired during Defendant's tenancy. 
(Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 15) 
Did not deny that Plaintiff agreed to termination of Defendant's lease. 
(Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 17) 
Did not deny that the premises were not compliant with the UFPA, the 
Ogden City Ordinance requiring residential rental licenses. (Defendant's 
Brief in Chief, page 16) 
Did not deny that he accepted Defendant's surrender of the premises. 
(Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 17) 
Did not deny mailing his security deposit notice to Defendant on 11/29/98, 
more than 30 days after acceptance of Defendant's surrender of the 
premises. (Trial Transcript page 193) 
Did not deny conspiring with Plaintiff to rent the premises with known 
safety defects, in direct violation of the UFPA and local ordinances. 
(Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 19) 
6 
1 j . Did not deny conspiring with Plaintiff to use rental income to fix known 
2 safety defects. (Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 19) 
3 k. Did not deny knowledge of the Ogden residential rental license 
4 requirement in May 1995, prior to entering into the lease agreement with 
5 Defendant. (Trial Transcript page 31) 
6 1. Did not deny that the premises contained numerous safety defects and 
7 building code violations. (Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 16) 
8 m. Did not deny the numerous violations of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
9 Procedure. (Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 20) 
10 In light of the 30 day extension granted to Third-Party Defendant for preparation of his 
11 Appellee brief, and that the resultant brief consisted of only ten pages (when allowed 50), one 
12 can easily conclude by the above lack of denial or counter argument that Third-Party Defendant 
13 agreed with the facts cited and arguments posed in Defendant's Brief in Chief. 
14 Summary of Defendant/Appellant's Argument 
15 Third-Party Defendant provided Defendant the keys to the premises on June 30, 1995, 
16 with the verified understanding that Plaintiffs personal property would be removed within two 
17 weeks, maximum. Since Plaintiffs personal property was scattered throughout the premises, 
18 prohibiting Defendant's access to or use of the premises, possession of the entire premises was 
19 never provided to Defendant. 
20 Refund of Defendant's security deposit was not contingent on completion of the lease 
21 term. It was contingent only on the extent of damages to Plaintiff, according to Third-Party 
22 Defendant's handwritten entries on lease agreement which stated "If no loss of income or 
1 damages to owner deposit would be refundable." (Exhibit 76-D) 
2 Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant's responsibilities with respect to the UFPA were not 
3 contingent on any notice by Defendant. Their responsibilities resulted solely from their renting 
4 a residence in Utah. 
5 
6 Issue #1 - Was the trial court correct in finding that Defendant breached the lease 
1 agreement without justifiable cause? 
8 Defendant did not breach the contract. Defendant surrendered the premises to Third-
9 Party Defendant, Plaintiffs agent, who, according to the Third-Party Defendant's testimony at 
10 trial, accepted the surrender and terminated the lease on behalf of Plaintiff, as follows: 
11 [Wheeler to Judge] I was informed that it was okay to terminate this 
12 lease based on the problems that she had had on this. She was at her wits end. 
13 Her children were in a wreck, she couldn't get down here to get this furniture out 
14 of this property and we had all these pressures on her. And so when I talked with 
15 her I don't know if she knew what I had asked her or not. I don't know to this, 
16 right now I don't know. But in her conversation with me she just, it was like she 
17 threw her hands in the air and she said I've had it, that's fine, that's it. And so 
18 that's what we acted upon with our conversation with Mr. Fink, [emphasis 
19 added] 
20 
21 Surrender of the premises by Defendant and acceptance by Third-Party Defendant (as 
22 Plaintiffs agent), and termination of the lease agreement on Plaintiffs behalf, obligated 
23 Plaintiff to that condition, and thereby terminated any responsibility for Defendant to perform 
24 further. 
25 All of the witnesses who testified to the condition of the premises were self-serving, 
26 except the Third-Party Defendant's maintenance man, Mr. Goddard. And he thought the 
27 property was grossly in need of repair as follows: 
28 Q. [Fink] Okay. What did you find when you first came out? What was 
29 your initial assessment of the property? 
30 A. [Goddard - Witness] It needed a lot of work. 
8 
1 Q. Okay. 
2 A. Had I walked through that place to rent it myself I wouldn't have rented it. 
3 Q. Okay. Do you recall making any knee jerk, gut feel reaction comment to 
4 what you thought the extent of the repairs were that were necessary? 
5 A. There was some repairs I wouldn't touch because I'm not qualified like the 
6 electrical— 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. — because it was a major electrical. If it's a switch or a plug or this I can 
9 take care of. But when you've got wires hanging down ~ And I told Mr. 
10 Wheeler that he should get a qualified electrician which I believe he did. 
11 Q. Okay. Do you recall making the statement that the owner needs to spend 
12 about six months rent or about $ 10,000 to fix this place? 
13 A. Yes. I probably said that. 
14 Mr. Glover, who had never visited the premises or reviewed construction drawings, had a 
15 professional self-serving interest in the declared condition of the property for he was the 
16 supervisor of the office which issued a residential rental license to Third-Party Defendant for 
17 the subject premises (as though it was code and safety compliant), after receipt of Defendant's 
18 10/18/95 complaint letter, Exhibit 81-D), Interesting, the most positive declaration he could 
19 muster about the property was when he stated "My first impression is probably tenantable but 
20 it needs some maintenance." 
21 Mr. Froerer was the replacement property manager for Plaintiff, after termination of 
22 Third-Party Defendant. Mr. Froerer, who also had a professional interest in the stated 
23 condition of the premises because he listed the premises on the rental market (as though it were 
24 code and safety compliant), stated that the premises required repairs to be habitable as follows: 
25 Q. [Fink] Back to the question Counsel asked on whether or not you thought 
26 the house was habitable. 
27 A. [Froerer] Uh-huh (affirmative). 
28 Q. With or without repair? 
29 A. No. We wanted repairs done. 
30 Mr. Wheeler, had a obvious self-serving interest in declaring the premises habitable, 
31 since he was the agent who leased the premises (as though it was code and safety complaint), 
9 
1 although he testified to having conspired with Plaintiff to rent the premises with known safety 
2 defects and use the rental income to fix the defects, while the renters endured the unsafe 
3 conditions as follows: 
4 Q. [Fink] What did you do to make the property habitable, presentable, fix 
5 things that were wrong with it during that time? 
6 A. [Wheeler - Witness] We didn't do much because of lack of income. 
7 Okay? We didn't do a lot to it. We maintained the outside of the yard. 
8 Didn't do anything electrical inside or anything that way. 
9 Q. So that was-
10 A. Pam didn't have a lot of funds to put into this property to get this thing put 
11 back together and wanted to use some of the rental money to fix it up. 
12 Q. So then it was, correct me if I'm wrong, is that to surmise that it was 
13 acceptable to have a tenant move in in those conditions and fix it with 
14 their money in effect? 
15 [Wells] That begs the question, Your Honor. 
16 [Judge] Well that's, that's appropriate. You can answer if you— 
17 [Wheeler - Witness] Could you state that question again please, Pat? 
18 Q. [Fink] Was the intent to have a tenant move in and fix the property with 
19 their money, the rental income? They were going to live in the conditions 
20 that you felt weren't right but you were going to use their money to fix it? 
21 A. [Wheeler] For a short period of time. 
22 
23 Plaintiffs self-serving interests in the declared condition of the premise are obvious. 
24 Issue #4 - Did the trial court have proper grounds for dismissal of Third-Party Complaint? 
25 Third-Party Defendant's argument on this point is completely misleading and without 
26 basis in either fact or law. While Third-Party Defendant provides no argument for the 
27 correctness of the trial court's dismissal of Defendant's Third-Party claims, he simply 
28 presumes the decision to be correct, without justification. He then attempts to mislead the 
29 Court by focusing on the unsupported argument that he should be awarded attorney's fees. The 
30 salient issue here is that the trial court's dismissal of Defendant's Third-Party claims was 
31 unjustified and unsupported by any findings of fact or evidence in the record. And there is no 
10 
1 argument by Third-Party Defendant to the contrary. 
2 And Third-Party Defendant's argument about the security deposit being non-refundable 
3 conspicuously omits a critical piece of evidence from Exhibit 76-D; that being the remainder of 
4 the handwritten entry at the bottom of the lease agreement which states "If no loss of income or 
5 damages to owner deposit would be refundable." At the time Third-Party Defendant was 
6 relieved as Plaintiffs agent, there was no indication to Defendant that Plaintiff had incurred 
7 any damages, since the premises were in better condition at termination than at the start of the 
8 lease (Exhibits 58-D through 63-D), and the deposit at that time was therefore fully-refundable 
9 to Defendant. Third-Party Defendant simply ignored the statute that requires full itemization 
10 of the deductions and/or refund within 30 calendar days of termination. And to compound the 
11 errors of Third-Party Defendant on this issue, the lease agreement required that the refund be 
12 provided within 14 days of termination (Exhibit 76-D). 
13 Issue #5 - Did the trial court properly act in dismissing Defendant's request for sanctions? 
14 Third-Party Defendant correctly identified that Defendant cited to the record for all 
15 instances of violation of Rule 11, URCP, as the factual basis for each violation. These citations 
16 are reiterated from Defendant's closing arguments for the convenience of the Court as follows: 
17 Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, and their respective attorneys 
18 exacerbated the many problems of discovery in this case by obfuscating 
19 the relevant facts and intentionally submitting information that was known 
20 to be inaccurate and incomplete, forcing Defendant to resort to motions to 
21 compel discovery and access upon land for inspection. The following is a 
22 brief listing of claims and facts which were submitted by Plaintiff and 
23 Third-Party Defendant during the proceedings of this case, which were 
24 known to be false, or which should have been known to be false at the 
25 time they were submitted: 
26 
27 a. In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit 
28 66-D, paragraph 3, denial of #5), Plaintiff denied the following claim by 
11 
Defendant "That Plaintiff was aware or should have been aware that said 
premise did not meet full compliance with the Uniform Code for Building 
Conservation." This denial was made in spite of correspondence from 
Defendant to Wheeler on 7/29/95 (Exhibit 79-D) which specifically stated 
that the property did not conform to UCBC. Plaintiff testified in trial that 
she received a tremendous amount of correspondence from Wheeler. 
Plaintiff further testified in deposition (Exhibit 65-D, page 5 that she was 
the general contractor for the remodeling (building) effort which resulting 
in the log style house that exists today, that she lived in the house for 
about 10 years (Exhibit 65-D, page 4), and that she was familiar with local 
building codes (Exhibit 65-D, page 5) and therefore should have been 
aware of the condition of the house with regard to prevailing building 
codes, and that her responses to other counterclaims (such as #2, #3, #6, 
#7, and #9) should not have been denied as well. 
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit 
66-D, paragraph 3, denial of #10), Plaintiff denied the following 
counterclaim by Defendant "That Plaintiff, by failing to provide premises 
that were in full compliance with the Uniform Code for Building 
Conservation and the Utah Fit Premises Act, created a situation in which 
Defendant either had to live in substandard and unsafe conditions or 
through the expenditure of his personal funds and efforts attempt to rectify 
code violations." Plaintiff later claimed in response to request for 
admissions numbers 3 and 22, dated April 24, 1996 (Exhibit 64-D), that 
"Defendant warranted tht [sic] the condition of the premises were in good 
repair and expressly agreed to repair and maintain the premises." These 
two positions are in direct contradiction of one another. 
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit 
66-D, paragraph 2, denial of #17), Plaintiff denied the following 
counterclaim by Defendant "That Plaintiff having personal knowledge, 
and knowledge by and through her agent, that her personal property and 
household effects were encumbering and limiting Defendant's use of the 
premises, and of Defendant's objection thereto, failed to remove all of said 
property." Exhibit 75-D, pages 20-24, a copy of which Plaintiff testified to 
receiving, along with Exhibits 79-D,80-D,81-D, and 82-D all address 
objection to Plaintiffs personal property. Additionally, rent was withheld 
as an incentive to Plaintiff to remove the personal property. 
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit 
66-D, paragraph 3, denial of #19), Plaintiff denied the following 
counterclaim by Defendant "That Plaintiff by and through her agent, was 
notified to cure Uniform Building Code and Utah Fit Premises Act 
violations." Exhibit 78-D contains specific identification of electrical 
system problems which constitute a violation of the Utah Fit Premises Act, 
12 
Utah Code Ann., Section 57 22-4(l)(c), and Exhibit 75-D, pages 20-24 
identify specific defects which are in violation of the Uniform Building 
Code. These documents were provided to Plaintiffs agent on July 7, 1995 
and to Plaintiff on July 18, 1995. 
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit 
66-D, paragraph 6, page 3, lines 6-7), Plaintiff asserts that Defendant took 
the premises "as-is." However, testimony from Third-Party Defendant 
articulated oral agreements between Defendant and Plaintiffs agent to 
repair defects and remove Plaintiff personal property. Additionally, 
Plaintiff testified in deposition (Exhibit 65-D, pages 17-18) that she 
removed some of her personal property "Because I had told you that I 
would make an attempt to get my things out of there, which I did." 
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit 
66-D, paragraph 3, page 3, lines 7-12), Plaintiff asserts that by "the parties 
agreed that certain items of Plaintiffs personality [sic] would be stored in 
the basement of the premises." During trial, her attorney stipulated that 
Plaintiff was never present during oral agreements. Also, the Tyler house 
does not have a basement. 
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit 
66-D, paragraph 6, page 3, lines 16- 18), Plaintiff claimed that "all 
personality [sic] of hers which remained in the premises remained there 
pursuant to a mutual agreement between the parties." Testimony provided 
by Third-Party Defendant articulated the oral agreement and contradicted 
her claim by stating that Plaintiffs personal property would be removed 
within two weeks of signing the lease. Further, Exhibit 75-D, pages 20-24, 
and Exhibits 79-D, 80-D, 81-D, and 82 D clearly indicate the agreement 
Plaintiff asserts was not mutual. 
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit 
66-D, paragraph 8, page 4, line 4), Plaintiff asserts that Defendant 
"abandoned the premises." However, testimony by Mr. Wheeler indicated 
that he obtained her concurrence with the termination when notified in late 
September, 1995, and accepted surrender of the premises on her behalf on 
October 20, 1995. Plaintiffs concurrence and acceptance of surrender are 
in direct conflict with the assertion of abandonment, and is indicative of 
the bad faith with which this Plaintiff proceeded to file suit knowing of her 
own breach and concurrence in the property manager's termination of the 
lease. 
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit 
66-D, paragraph 5, line 2-3, and paragraph 11, lines 3-4), Plaintiff claimed 
in reference to the defects identified by Defendant, that "certain rivial [sic] 
13 
aspects of the premises did not meet with his approval" and "These iterms 
[sic] were of a minor and trivial nature." Plaintiff later testified that there 
were some major defects identified on the listing attached to the July 7, 
1995 letter to Third Party Defendant (Exhibit 75-D, page 20), which was 
also personally handed to Plaintiff on July 18, 1995. Also, testimony by 
Mr. Goddard indicated that it would take about $10,000 or six months rent 
to fix the problems, and that he had detailed those problems to Mr. 
Wheeler in April and May of 1995. 
In an April 24, 1996 response to Defendant's request for admissions 
(Exhibit 64-D, Request No. 3), Plaintiff denied that there was no physical 
damage to the premises caused by Defendant. Third-Party Defendant 
admitted on March 29, 1996, in response to Defendant's request for 
admissions, that the premises were in better condition at termination than 
at the beginning of tenancy. 
In an April 24, 1996 response to Defendant's request for admissions 
regarding Plaintiff personal property (Exhibit 64-D, Request Nos. 4, 5, 
8-16, & 19-20), Plaintiff asserted that Defendant "accepted the subject 
property in the conditions [sic] it was in due to his desire to have 
immediate occupancy of the premises)." Plaintiff later testified in 
deposition (Exhibit 65-D, pages 17-18 ) to removing some of the property 
because "I had told you I would make an attempt to get my things out of 
there." Further, documentation abounds in Exhibits 79-D,80-D, 81-D, 
82-D,and 75-D, pages 20-24 concerning the interference of personal 
property, including rent withholding as an incentive to motivate Plaintiff. 
In an April 24, 1996 response to Defendant's request for admissions 
(Exhibit 64-D, Request Nos. 3 and 22), Plaintiff claimed that "Defendant 
expressly warranted tht [sic] the premises were in good repair and 
expressly agreed to repair and maintain the premises." However, testimony 
provided by Third-Party Defendant revealed an agreement between 
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant to use rental income to pay for repair 
of known defects in the premises. Additionally, the property management 
agreement with Third-Party Defendant (Exhibit 75-D, page 19) included 
provisions to "supervise and discharge all labor required for the operation 
and maintenance of the property." 
In a May 15, 1996 response to Defendant's request for interrogatories and 
production of documents (Exhibit 74-D), Plaintiff claimed that the Tyler 
house "Passed UBC inspections when it was built." However, testimony 
by Mr. Glover revealed that the current records from the Ogden City 
repository (Exhibits 69-D, 70-D and 72-D) indicate that the required 
building permits were never issued and the required inspections were 
never performed on the Tyler house. These records were finally checked 
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by Plaintiffs attorney the day preceding the trial, and then only because he 
had been notified that Mr. Glover would be a witness for defense. Plaintiff 
testified in deposition (Exhibit 65-D, pages 4 and 5) that she was the 
general contractor for the building, and that "I helped design the house, I 
helped build it, I was involved with all of it." Thereby indicating that she 
should have been cognizant of the requirements for inspection. 
In a May 15, 1996 response to Defendant's request for interrogatories and 
production of documents (Exhibit 74-D, page 9, Request No. 4 ), Plaintiff 
claimed that there was no correspondence, notes, documents, or 
memorandums related to the Tyler property, and that she therefore could 
not provide anything in response to the Defendant's request for 
documentation. However, in testimony, she admitted to receiving so much 
correspondence from Third-Party Defendant that she didn't know what to 
do with it. 
In her deposition on August 31, 1996 (Exhibit 65-D, page 9), Plaintiff 
testified that when she terminated Third-Party Defendant as agent on or 
about November 14, 1995 (Exhibit 75-D, page 10, shows last action date), 
she "was questioning whether I wanted to continue to lease the house or 
rent it to anybody." Records provided by Plaintiff (Exhibit 73-D, page 5) 
indicate that Plaintiff commissioned Froerer Real Estate as property 
manager only two days later on November 16, 1995, thereby suggesting 
the her answer as to the reason for termination was questionable at best. 
In her deposition on August 31, 1996 (Exhibit 65-D, page 13), Plaintiffs 
attorney stated "from July 1 through approximately October 20, 1995, 
there is no argument regarding what you paid, what you deducted, and that 
there were no late fees for that period." -Plaintiffs lawsuit claim states that 
I refused to pay late fees for September and October, 1995. Nevertheless, 
Plaintiff did not amend her complaint to drop that claim or stipulate that 
Defendant did not need to further expend time and money to defend 
against this claim. 
In her deposition on August 31, 1996 (Exhibit 65-D, pages 21-22), in an 
obvious attempt to deny the serious defects in the electrical system that 
existed during Defendant's tenancy, Plaintiff testified that no repair was 
performed by Froerer on the electrical system. Records provided by Mr. 
Froerer (Exhibit 86-D) and testimony by Mr. Froerer indicate that 
significant electrical system repairs were completed in November and 
December 1995, and that itemized statements were provided to Plaintiff 
pursuant to his property management contract. 
In her deposition on August 31, 1996 (Exhibit 65-D, page 28), Plaintiff 
testified that Mr. John Saunders of Ogden City performed all required 
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1 UBC inspections, yet the city records and testimony provided by Mr. 
2 Glover indicate that the required plans were not submitted, the permits 
3 were not issued, and the inspections were not performed (Exhibits 69-D, 
4 70-D, and 72-D). 
5 
6 s. In his 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 response to Defendant's complaint (Exhibit 
7 83-D, page 2, paragraph 3), Third-Party Defendant claimed that he "had no 
8 responsibility to Third-Party Plaintiff at the time of the termination" of the 
9 lease. His attorney later stated that the attorney wrote that section, in error. 
10 This was clearly a known false statement and a clumsy effort to avoid 
11 liability for the misappropriation of Defendant's security deposit. 
12 
13 t. In his 2/9196 and 2/21/96 responses to Defendant's complaint (Exhibit 
14 83-D, page 1, paragraph 1, reference to paragraph 5), Third-Party 
15 Defendant claimed that he didn't have enough information to form an 
16 opinion of whether or not he was aware of the Ogden city requirement for 
17 licensing residential rental properties. According to testimony provided by 
18 Mr. Glover, Third-Party Defendant was notified of the requirement in 
19 writing by Ogden City on May 25, 1995 (Exhibits 92-D and 94-D). 
20 
21 u. In his 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 responses to Defendant's complaint (Exhibit 
22 83-D, page 1, reference to paragraph 9), Third-Party Defendant claimed 
23 that he didn't have enough information to form an opinion of whether or 
24 not he was notified to cure by Defendant of UCBC and Utah Fit Premises 
25 Act violations in the property and failed to do so. Records he provided in 
26 discovery included the July 29, 1995 letter (Exhibit 75-D, pages 25/26 and 
27 Exhibit 79-D) from Defendant to Third-Party Defendant stating 
28 non-compliance with the UCBC. 
29 
30 v. In his 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 response to Defendant's complaint (Exhibit 
31 83-D), Third-Party Defendant denied that he knew the property was not 
32 code compliant. He later testified that he and the Plaintiff knew the house 
33 needed work had planned to use rental income to repair known defects. 
34 
35 w. In his response to Defendant's complaint on 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 (Exhibit 
36 83-D), Third-Party Defendant denied that he failed to have Plaintiffs 
37 personal property removed according to the oral agreement, but later 
38 testified to the oral agreement to remove the property within two weeks of 
39 signing the lease agreement. 
40 
41 x. In his response to Defendant's complaint on 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 (Exhibit 
42 83-D), Third-Party Defendant denied that he failed to complete required 
43 repairs according to the oral agreement, but later testified to the oral 
44 agreement to repair the electrical system defects within two weeks of 
45 signing the lease agreement, and maintenance records provided by 
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Third-Party Defendant indicate that no electrical system repairs were 
completed. 
In his response to Defendant's complaint on 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 (Exhibit 
83-D), Third-Party Defendant denied that Defendant notified him of the 
reasons for rent withholding, yet, in discovery, provided copies of 
Defendant letters (Exhibit 75-D) dated July 29 (Exhibit 79-D), August 31 
(Exhibit 80-D), and September 30, 1995 (Exhibit 81-D), all of which 
itemize the withholdings. 
In his response to Defendant's complaint on 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 (Exhibit 
83-D), Third-Party Defendant denied that he failed to comply with the 
provisions of Utah Ann., Section 57-17 regarding refund of deposits. This 
claim was made in spite of his letter dated November 15, 1995 (Exhibit 
84-D), which does not contain required information and which was mailed 
on November 29, 1995, and his own property management records 
(Exhibit 75-D, page 10), which indicate that the deposit was spent on 
routine repairs, advertisements, bank charges, and a license application, 
rather that being forwarded to Plaintiff as claimed. 
In his response to Defendant's request for admissions on March 29, 1996, 
Third-Party Defendant denied that Defendant did not accept the property 
"as-is", yet testified to oral agreements to remove Plaintiffs personal 
property and complete the electrical system and repairs within two weeks 
of signing the lease agreement. 
In his response to Defendant's request for admissions on March 29, 1996, 
Third-Party Defendant claimed that Defendant's security deposit of 
$800.00 was forward to Plaintiff, however his own property management 
records (Exhibit 75-D, page 10) indicate that the deposit was spent, except 
for $59.35, which was forwarded to the Plaintiff on November 14, 1995. 
In his response to Defendant's request for admissions on March 29, 1996, 
Third-Party Defendant claimed to have had the garage door keyless entry 
system repaired, however his own property management records clearly 
indicate that there was never a repair completed on the entry system, and it 
was in fact never repaired. The combo had been changed, but that was 
before Defendant notified Third-Party Defendant on 7/29/95 (Exhibit 
79-D) that the system was inoperative. 
In his response to Defendant's request for admissions on March 29, 1996, 
Third Party Defendant claimed that the Plaintiffs personal property was 
stored on the premises with permission of Defendant, but failed when 
repeatedly requested in discovery to produce any documentation of that 
permission, and later testified to the oral agreement to remove the property 
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1 within two weeks of signing the lease agreement. 
2 
3 ee. In his response to Defendant's request for admissions on March 29, 1996, 
4 Third-Party Defendant claimed that only four light fixtures were defective, 
5 yet testified to previous agreement with Plaintiff that the needed repairs 
6 were so extensive as to need to use rental income to pay for them. 
7 
8 ff. In his responses to Defendant's requests for interrogatories and production 
9 of documents on April 30, 1996 (Exhibit 75-D), Third-Party Defendant 
10 failed to provide the residence address for Mr. Goddard until the hearing 
11 on August 31, 1996, and even then, Third-Party Defendant provided the 
12 address from memory while his attorney was expounding to the Court why 
13 that information couldn't be provided. 
14 
15 gg. In his responses to Defendant's requests for interrogatories and production 
16 of documents on April 30, 1996 (Exhibit 75-D), Third-Party Defendant 
17 indicated that maintenance personnel Mike Goddard, Mike Bachman, and 
18 Ron of Rocky Mountain Door would be witnesses (with no other 
19 requested witness information provided) until a late supplemental response 
20 to Defendant's motion to compel changed that response to indicate they 
21 were never to be witnesses. 
22 
23 hh. In his responses to Defendant's requests for interrogatories and production 
24 of documents on April 30, 1996 (Exhibit 75-D), Third-Party Defendant 
25 claimed that he responded to Defendant's July 7, 1995 listing of defects to 
26 the extent that Defendant provided access to the premises, yet his own 
27 property management records indicate no repairs until September, 1995, 
28 and Mr. Goddard testified to establishing a weekly time for access to the 
29 property for repairs and maintenance at the first meeting when dispatched 
30 by Third-Party Defendant in early July 1995. 
31 
32 And Third-Party Defendant's assertion regarding Rule 24(a)(5)(A), Utah Rules of 
33 Appellate Procedure attempts to mislead the Court, for Defendant established the basis for 
34 appeal according to Rule 24(a)(5)(B) in his Brief in Chief, on page three, as follows: 
35 
36 Statement of Grounds for seeking review of issues not preserved in trial 
37 court 
38 
39 As a Pro Se litigant, experiencing his first visit to a trial court, Defendant 
40 was not aware of the requirement to tell the court how to handle pre-trial motions 
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1 or court proceedings initiated by the judge. Additionally, all of the other issues in 
2 this appeal involve actions that occurred after completion of the trial proceedings. 
3 
4 "It is, of course, true that a party need not request amendment to the 
5 findings of fact at the trial level in order to pursue an appeal thereon. " 
6 Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 1979) 
7 
8 Issue #9 - Was the trial court correct in finding that Defendant was required to provide a 
9 second Utah Fit Premises Act notice in an action for breach of contract and constructive 
10 eviction? 
11 The UFPA applies only to the habitability concerns of the premises, not the constructive 
12 eviction issues regarding failure to deliver and obstruction of use and enjoyment of the 
13 premises. Therefore, Defendant was not required to provide formal notice of intent to take 
14 legal action for the failure of Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant to remove Plaintiffs personal 
15 property from the premises. Nor was Defendant required to provide formal notice that the 
16 property was not habitable, since the uninhabitable conditions existed from the beginning of 
17 the lease term, and were known by both Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant prior to placing 
18 the property on the rental market. 
19 The UFPA applies to all residential rentals, providing guidance on the minimum 
20 standards with which all landlords must comply. The provisions of the UFPA address what 
21 landlords must do, what tenants must do, and what can be done if either fails to comply. 
22 In the event that the condition of a property falls below minimum habitable standards, 
23 there are provisions within the UFPA for formal notice of defects and legal action by the 
24 tenant. The notices of defect must also allow adequate time for the landlord to respond by 
25 curing the defects. These provisions are appropriate only if the property falls below acceptable 
26 standards, since landlords can rent only UFPA compliant premises. The language of the 
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1 UFPA indicates a presumption that the conditions of the premises are always habitable at the 
2 start of the lease term. However, when the conditions are unacceptable at the beginning of the 
3 lease term, the landlord is non-compliant with the provisions of the UFPA, and the notice 
4 requirements imposed on the tenant are not applicable. 
5 Under no reasonable interpretation of the law is a tenant required to endure uninhabitable 
6 conditions as a matter of law. When a landlord fails to provide habitable conditions, the 
7 implied warranty of habitability is breached, and consequently, the lease agreement as a 
8 binding contract is breached, leaving the tenant with two choices: terminate and vacate, or 
9 remain in the premises and invoke the legal action provisions of the UFPA. If the tenant at that 
10 juncture elects to vacate the premises and terminate the contract, the tenant is considered to be 
11 constructively evicted by virtue of the uninhabitable conditions and the formal notice and legal 
12 action provisions of the UFPA do not apply. If the tenant elects to remain in the premises, the 
13 formal notice and legal action provisions of the UFPA can be used by the tenant to secure 
14 needed repairs. The UFPA provides a vehicle and leverage for correction of the uninhabitable 
15 conditions while remaining in the premises. And it is when the tenant chooses to remain in the 
16 premises, and only then, that the UFPA requirements for formal deficiency notification to the 
17 landlord become effective. The UFPA, with its inherent notification requirements, is simply 
18 one of the means that a tenant may employ to retain habitable conditions. 
19 
20 
1 CONCLUSION 
2 
3 It is plainly evident from the preceding that the Third-Party Defendant has no factual 
4 basis for denial that the trial court erred throughout the course of this case. The conspicuous 
5 absence of denial or argument against the arguments posed in Defendant's Brief in Chief serve 
6 as compelling evidence of Third-Party Defendant's agreement with Defendant's Brief in Chief. 
7 As stated in Defendant's Brief in Chief, it is only through reversal of all aspects of the 
8 judgement, or a complete and impartial review of the facts in this matter by the appellate court, 
9 that justice can be achieved in this matter. Therefore, Defendant requests reversal on all 
10 rulings of the trial court or a de novo review by the appellate court of the evidence of record in 
11 this case, with damages, expenses, and appeal costs (to be provided via later affidavit) awarded 
12 to Defendant. 
13 
14 
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